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Backlash’s Travels 
 
Cass R. Sunstein* 
 
Abstract 
 
Sometimes the public greatly opposes the decisions of the Supreme Court; 
sometimes the Court seems to anticipate public backlash and even to respond to it when 
it occurs. Should a social planner want the Court to anticipate or to respond to backlash? 
No abstract answer is possible; the appropriate conclusion depends on assumptions 
about the capacities of courts and the capacities of those who engage in backlash. This 
point is demonstrated through an exploration of four imaginable worlds: Olympus, the 
Land of the Ancients, Lochnerland, and Athens. The four worlds reflect radically 
different assumptions about judicial and public capacities. The proper analysis of 
backlash depends, in large part, on the prevailing theory of constitutional interpretation, 
and on whether judges have privileged access to constitutional meaning. If judges lack 
such access, backlash is a healthy part of dialogue between judges and the public, and 
the judiciary should sometimes yield. If our world is Olympus, the argument for attention 
to backlash is severely weakened. 
 
 
 
 
 Let us define “public backlash,” in the context of constitutional law, in the 
following way: Intense and sustained public disapproval of a judicial ruling, 
accompanied by aggressive steps to resist that ruling and to remove its legal force.  
It is easy to imagine cases in which a controversial judicial ruling is likely to produce 
public backlash. Perhaps the ruling involves property rights, presidential power in 
connection with the war on terror, the use of the words “under God” in the Pledge of 
Allegiance, the placement of the Ten Commandments on public property, or same-sex 
marriage.  
Let us simply stipulate that if the Court rules in a certain way in such cases, public 
outrage could significantly affect national politics and undermine the very cause that the 
ruling is attempting to promote. Perhaps the ruling would prove futile or 
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counterproductive, or produce overall social harm. Perhaps the ruling would set in motion 
forces that would ultimately led to its own demise. How should a social planner want 
courts to respond to the risk of backlash? 
My principal claim in this essay is that no sensible answer to this question can be 
given in the abstract. Any judgment must inevitably depend on certain assumptions about 
institutional capacities and characteristics.1 Under easily imaginable assumptions, courts 
should ignore the risk of backlash and rule as they see fit. Under assumptions that are 
different but also easily imaginable, the restraining effect of backlash is highly desirable, 
and it is very good that courts are affected by it. The risk of backlash has sometimes 
proved a deterrent to desirable rulings from the Court; it has also helped to deter rulings 
that are not at all desirable. If these conclusions are right, they raise serious questions 
about a tempting view within the legal culture, which is that courts should decide as they 
see fit and let the chips fall as they may. That view might ultimately be right, but it 
depends on contentious judgments about the abilities of both courts and the public.  
As we shall see, those who believe in “popular constitutionalism,”2 on normative 
grounds, might well be led to the conclusion that judges should pay careful attention to 
the risk of backlash. For example, Larry Kramer writes that under the original 
understanding, “Final interpretive authority rested with ‘the people themselves,’ and 
courts no less than elected representatives were subordinate to their judgments.”3 On this 
view, backlash deserves careful attention when it occurs. If judges anticipate it, they 
would do well to limit themselves accordingly, perhaps by invoking justiciability 
doctrines to avoid the merits, perhaps by ruling narrowly, perhaps by deferring to the 
elected branches.  
If the argument here is correct, the claim that judges should attend to the prospect 
of backlash stands or falls on particular judgments about constitutional method and 
                                                 
1 Robert Post and Reva Siegel, this issue, argue on behalf a model of democratic constitutionalism in which 
courts retain a prominent role. They celebrate Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 550 US 833 (1992), and thus 
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institutional capacities. If we believe that the meaning of the Constitution is settled by the 
original understanding, “the people themselves” may be ill-equipped to uncover that 
meaning, and perhaps judges should pay little or no attention to the public’s desires. But 
if we believe that the meaning of the Constitution is inevitably settled by reference to 
moral and political judgments, and if courts are not especially good at making those 
judgments, popular constitutionalism, and attention to backlash, have far more appeal. 
My purpose, however, is not to indicate a final view on appropriate response to the risk 
and actuality of backlash.4 I aim instead to explore the grounds on which such a view 
must be defended.  
I attempt that exploration through an admittedly unusual route. I specify a diverse 
array of nations, or lands, in which the analysis of backlash must take a distinctive form. 
Unlike Gulliver, backlash is not a person; but we can learn a great deal, I am hoping, by 
investigating backlash’s travels. 
 
I. Olympus 
 
Let us imagine a nation—call it Olympus—in which judicial judgments are 
reliably right, from the relevant point of view, and in which public opposition to those 
judgments, when it exists, are reliably wrong. To make the example simple and intuitive, 
let us begin by supposing that judicial decisions about constitutional meaning involve 
moral judgments of one or another sort.5 On this assumption, the constitutionality of 
racial segregation, restrictions on the right to choose abortion, or bans on same-sex 
marriage turns, in significant part, on moral judgments. Perhaps the relevant practices are 
valid if and only if they can be supported by reference to justifications that are at once 
legitimate and weighty. If we suppose that judges can assess that question reliably, and 
that any public backlash is based on grounds that are either illegitimate or weightless, the 
argument for taking account of backlash seems very weak. At first glance, the duty of 
judges is to rule on the Constitution’s meaning; if backlash occurs, it is by hypothesis 
irrelevant to the judges’ job. 
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Fleming, Securing the Constitution (2006). 
4 
The first glance is essentially right. For those who believe that our world is 
Olympus, it is usually inappropriate for judges to attend to backlash. But things are not 
quite so clear, even in Olympus. To see why, consider the debate between Alexander 
Bickel and Gerald Gunther about judicial exercise of the “passive virtues,” captured in 
the Supreme Court’s refusal to decide certain controversial questions.6 Bickel seemed to 
think that the United States is, in an important sense, Olympus. He insisted that the 
Court’s role was to announce certain enduring values—to discern principles that would 
properly organize constitutional life. Bickel believed that courts were in a unique position 
to carry out that role. In his view, “courts have certain capacities for dealing with matters 
of principle that legislatures and executives do not possess.”7 Indeed, “judges have, or 
should have, the leisure, the training, and the insulation follow the ways of the scholar” in 
thinking about those enduring values.8  
To this extent, Bickel showed great faith in the capacities of judges to think about 
what political morality required. “Their insulation and the marvelous mystery of time 
give courts the capacity to men’s better natures, to call forth their aspirations, which may 
have been forgotten in the moment’s hue and cry.”9 Thus “no other branch of government 
is nearly so well equipped to conduct” a kind of vital natural seminar, through which the 
most basic principles are discovered and announced.10 Pressed by expediency and by 
short-term pressures, other institutions are poorly equipped to understand what principle 
required, at least by comparison with the judiciary.  
Nor was Bickel enthusiastic about “the people themselves.” On the contrary, he 
wrote that “the people themselves, by direct action at the ballot box, are surely incapable 
of sustaining a working system of general values specifically applied.” In his view, 
“matters of principles” require “intensive deliberation” and should not be submitted to a 
direct referendum.11 It should be clear that this is an emphatically Olympian conception 
                                                 
6 See Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (1965); Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the 
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7 Id. at 25. 
8 Id.  
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10 Id.  
11 Id. at 27. 
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of the role of the Supreme Court. What is perhaps most remarkable about that conception 
is that many people have shared it in the decades since Bickel first wrote.12 
At the same time, Bickel believed that a heterogeneous society could not possibly 
be principle-ridden. Too much of the time, such a society would resist the imposition of 
principles, even if they were entirely sound. In this respect Bickel invoked the example of 
Abraham Lincoln, who seemed to him a kind of model for the Supreme Court itself.13 
Bickel read Lincoln to be unambivalent in his condemnation of the institution of slavery, 
but also to believe that immediate abolition was impractical, simply because it would 
meet with such widespread opposition. In Lincoln's view, the feeling of "the great mass 
of white people" would not permit abolition.14 In his most striking formulation, Lincoln 
declared: "Whether this feeling accords with justice and sound judgment, is not the sole 
question, if indeed, it is any part of it. A universal feeling, whether well or ill-founded, 
can not be safely disregarded."15  
Bickel argued that the Supreme Court maintained a kind of Lincolnian tension, 
and that it did so through the use of the passive virtues, by which it stayed its own hand in 
deference to anticipated public resistance. In his view, judges who invalidate legislative 
policy “most act rigorously on principle, else it undermines the justification for its 
power.”16 The same is true when the court validates a legislative action.17 But the Court 
might also refuse to decide. It might give the political processes relatively free play, 
because it has neither upheld nor invalidated their decisions. In his view, “No good 
society can be unprincipled; and no viable society can be principle-ridden.”18 The task of 
judicial review is to maintain both “guiding principle and expedient compromise”19—and 
to do so by staying its hand in the face of strong popular opposition, however 
indefensible the opposition might be.  
                                                 
12 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (2006). 
13 Bickel, supra note, at 66-70. 
14 Id at 66 (quoting Abraham Lincoln, speech at Peoria, Illinois (Oct. 16, 1854), in 2 THE COLLECTED 
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 256 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 69. 
17 Id. at 70. 
18 Id. at 64. 
19 Id. 
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In response, Gunther was mostly aghast.20 In his famous phrase, Gunther wrote 
that Bickel seemed to believe that the Supreme Court should be “100 percent principled, 
20 percent of the time.”21 By contrast, Gunther thought that the Court should be 100 
percent principled all of the time. Accepting Bickel’s basic conception of the Court’s role 
as the elaborator of sound principles, he insisted that the passive virtues should not be 
invoked as a basis for judicial refusals to invalidate unconstitutional action. 
We should be able to see that both Bickel and Gunther write as if our world is 
Olympus—as if the Supreme Court has special access to constitutional meaning, 
understanding that concept in terms that acknowledge the Court’s creative role in 
discerning the governing principles. Both believed, moreover, that public backlash is not 
well-founded—that it is essentially unprincipled, a refusal to act in accordance with 
constitutional commands. Undoubtedly they were influenced in this regard by the 
distinctive period in which they wrote, in which the Warren Court was engaged in a 
serious of projects, including above all racial desegregation, that seemed required from 
the moral point of view. Recall here that Bickel’s model is the conflict between Lincoln’s 
moral commitments and the intransigence of those who defended slavery. Recall too the 
ban on racial intermarriage is the problem in which Bickel praised, and Gunther 
condemned, the Court for exercising the passive virtues.22 
The simple conclusion is that to the extent that our world is Olympus, it is not 
easy to defend the proposition that courts should care about backlash. The most that can 
be said is that even in Olympus, courts might plausibly use the passive virtues so as to 
preserve the Lincolnian tension between principle and expediency. This is an important 
point, but it is merely a qualification of the basic point, which is that because judges are 
right and an outraged public is wrong, backlash deserves consideration only rarely and 
only for prudential reasons. 
 
II. The Land of the Ancients 
 
Now let us adopt different assumptions. Let us imagine that we have arrived at the 
Land of the Ancients, in which constitutional meaning is best understood in originalist 
                                                 
20 Gunther, supra note. 
21 Id. at 3. 
22 See Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956) 
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terms. In this land, the meaning of the document is captured by the intentions of the 
ratifiers,23 or perhaps by its original public meaning.24 (We need not pause over the 
distinction between the two approaches, even though it might be important in some 
cases.) In the Land of the Ancients, all judges are self-conscious and unambivalent 
originalists. 
Let us assume as well that the Supreme Court is especially good at discerning 
constitutional meaning, thus understood, and that the public is very bad at that task. 
Perhaps the public is essentially uninterested in the outcomes dictated by originalism; 
perhaps the public is incompetent in thinking about what originalism requires. When 
backlash occurs in the Land of the Ancients, it is because the public’s (legally irrelevant) 
judgments of policy and principle have been rejected by the Court’s (legally sound) 
judgments about the original understanding. In this particular land, some members of the 
public are skeptical of originalism as such; some people reject the outcomes that 
originalism produces; many people reject originalism because it produces the relevant 
outcomes.  
In the Land of the Ancients, judges are entirely comfortable with democratic 
corrections to the outcomes required by originalism. Suppose, for example, that the 
Constitution is taken not to create a right to choose abortion, or to include protection 
against discrimination on the basis of sex. If political majorities seek to use political 
processes to protect the right to choose abortion, or to ban sex discrimination, judges in 
the Land of the Ancients will have no complaint. Of course such judges will not permit 
democratic majorities from acting so as to defy the original understanding—by, for 
example, denying African-Americans the right to vote, or allowing legislation to count as 
such when it has not been presented to the President. But originalists agree that 
constitutional change remains permissible through the ordinary channels for amendment. 
If judges are right to commit themselves to originalism, the social planner should 
not want the Court to take account of backlash, certainly at first glance. By hypothesis, 
the Court is correct on the relevant question and the public is wrong. Indeed, the situation 
here is exceedingly close to the situation in Olympus. Even or perhaps especially if the 
                                                 
23 See Sai Prakash, Radicals in Tweed Jackets, Colum L Rev (2006). 
24 See Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation (1997). 
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favored interpretive method is originalist, the public’s views about the meaning of the 
Constitution are irrelevant. The Court should rule as it sees fit, whatever the public’s 
response.25 With respect to backlash, we could easily imagine a working alliance between 
Olympians, who read the Constitution in moral terms,26 and originalists, whose lodestar 
is history. The alliance is joined by people with diverse interpretive methods who 
nonetheless agree that the Court ought not to attend to the risk and reality of backlash. 
But there is a counterargument, or at least a contrary consideration. Perhaps a 
Bickelian approach is appropriate in the Land of the Ancients. Perhaps a Bickelian could 
be convinced that originalism is the correct approach and that the original understanding 
exhausts constitutional meaning—while also acknowledging that no society can be 100 
percent originalist 100 percent of the time. One reason might be the existence of 
longstanding departures from the original understanding, some of which were permitted, 
and others engineered, by the Supreme Court itself. Perhaps a theory of stare decisis, or 
of respect for settled social practices, is necessary or appropriate in the Land of the 
Ancients.27 If the nation has long allowed independent regulatory agencies, or if the 
Court has long banned sex discrimination, judges in the Land of the Ancients might not 
object, even if originalism condemns independent regulatory agencies and permits sex 
discrimination. Perhaps such judges are attuned not merely to reliance interests, but to a 
large set of considerations of which public backlash is a part. 
A variation on this view is Lincolnian. Perhaps there are quasi-Bickelians in the 
Land of the Ancients, who believe that adherence to the original meaning is what 
principle requires, while also insisting that prudence—understood as caution in 
implementing understandings rejected by the public—has an important place. Even if 
nothing can be said, in principle, to support the public’s resistance to adherence to the 
original understanding, the social consequences of judicial insistence on that 
understanding might well be unacceptable. Those consequences are especially likely to 
be unacceptable if the public is genuinely outraged. It follows that originalist judges 
                                                 
25 Cf. the comments of Justice Scalia in Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law is a Law of Rules, 56 U Chi L 
Rev 1175 (1989). 
26 See Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution (2002). 
27 See the reference to “faint-hearted originalism” in Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation, supra note. 
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might stay their hand, at least if they can do so without greatly compromising the rule of 
law. 
What emerges is that notwithstanding the large differences in interpretive 
methods, the Land of the Ancients is relevantly close to Olympus. As a strong 
presumption, backlash is irrelevant. But there might well be a prudential argument, in 
extreme cases, for anticipating it, and for refusing to cause it, at least if the consequences 
would be very bad. An Olympian judge might hesitate before declaring that the 
Constitution requires states to recognize same-sex marriages. A judge in the Land of the 
Ancients might hesitate before ruling that the Endangered Species Act is beyond 
congressional power under the Commerce Clause, or that racial segregation, if required 
by the national government, offends no provision of the Constitution—even if such a 
judge believes that the original Constitution does not allow the Endangered Species Act 
and fails to forbid racial segregation at the national level. 
It is true that in the Land of the Ancients, the views of the public have no 
interpretive authority; they tell us nothing about what the Constitution means. But a judge 
who works there might be willing to use doctrines of justiciability in order to avoid bad 
consequences. Of course such a judge will want to see that the use of such doctrines can 
itself be justified by reference to the original understanding. Perhaps the relevant 
doctrines can be so justified, and perhaps they will allow courts some room to maneuver. 
At the very least, an originalist judge might dare to hope so. 
 
III. Lochnerland 
 
Now let us alter our assumptions in a more significant way. In the land that I now 
propose to investigate, things are closer to Olympus than to the Land of the Ancients in 
the following respect: Constitutional meaning is properly, or even inevitably, a product of 
the political or moral judgments of the interpreter. Let us assume further that interpreters, 
to qualify as such, cannot be freestanding moral or political arbiters; they owe a duty of 
fidelity to the relevant legal materials. Nonetheless, the document contains significant 
ambiguities or gaps, so that ultimate judgments often depend on contestable views about 
policy and principle. Let us assume finally—and this is the key step, the departure from 
Olympus—that judicial views about policy and principle are systematically unreliable 
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and that public backlash, when it occurs, is founded on good grounds, in the sense that 
the public’s judgments are simply better than that of the Supreme Court.  
In short, we are now speaking of Lochnerland, in which judicial errors are 
inevitable. How, if at all, should the analysis of backlash be affected? 
 
A. Judicial Error 
 
It should be clear that under the stated assumptions, the social planner would very 
much want the Court to take account of the risk of backlash. By hypothesis, consideration 
of backlash will move the Court in better directions. At a minimum, the social planner 
might insist that the judges of Lochnerland should pay attention to public judgments as 
they are reflected in backlash—perhaps by staying their hand, by invoking justiciability 
doctrines, if the risk of significant backlash is high. But the social planner might well go 
much farther. Indeed, the idea that we are in Lochnerland helps to explain the influentual 
views of James Bradley Thayer on the appropriate posture of the Supreme Court.28 
Thayer believed that the Court should strike down legislation unless if the violation of the 
Constitution was “beyond a reasonable doubt.”29 We can think of Thayerism as a 
generalization of the idea that courts should anticipate backlash and be cautious if it is 
likely to occur. But Thayer was far more ambitious than that. Thayer suggested, much 
more broadly, than the Court should generally defer to the public’s judgments, and their 
judgments about constitutional commands, unless those judgments are palpably wrong.30 
To say that courts should hesitate in the face of backlash is simply to offer a modest 
specification of Thayer’s general view. 
To be sure, Thayer’s approach leaves a large gap, one that Thayer himself did not 
fill: By what theory can we tell whether there is a constitutional violation? Thayerism 
cannot be a complete account of the judicial role, because the question whether there is a 
clear violation depends on the method by which the Constitution is read. We could 
imagine originalist Thayerians, who believe that legislation must be upheld unless the 
violation of the original understanding is palpable. On this view, the legislature would 
                                                 
28 See James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 
Harv. L. Rev. 129 (1893); Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty (2006). 
29 Id. at 135. 
30 Id. For a modern version, see Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty (2006). I am identifying here 
“the public” with the public’s elected representatives, who were Thayer’s focus. 
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receive the benefit of all reasonable doubts in the face of originalist challenges. We could 
also imagine Olympian Thayerians, who believe that legislation must be upheld unless 
the violation of relevant moral principles is plain.  
But the core point is that Thayerian approaches emphasize the likelihood of 
judicial error. In Lochnerland, attention to the risk of backlash seems obligatory, simply 
because it produces better results by stipulation. In Lochnerland, it is highly desirable for 
judges to anticipate public backlash and to attempt to avoid it. The reason is that judges 
will do better, in principle, if they defer to an aroused citizenry. 
It is sad but true that the judges of Lochnerland might not willingly adopt 
Thayerism or even to attend to the risk of backlash. By hypothesis, these are the judges of 
Lochnerland, and their judgments are systematically unreliable. Such judges are likely to 
err while also being confident that they are unerring. Perhaps the judges of Lochnerland 
think they live in Olympus; it would not be the first time. But perhaps a norm or practice 
might be developed of judicial self-discipline, so that fallible judges, made alert to their 
own fallibility, adopt measures to limit their own mistakes. Such measures might involve 
doctrines of justiciability, designed to reduce the judicial presence; or minimalism, 
designed to ensure a degree of narrowness and shallowness31; or generalized deference, 
designed to impose a heavy burden of proof and persuasion on those who challenge 
legislatures. 
 
B. Popular Constitutionalism, Jefferson’s Revenge, and Condorcet 
 
Let us revisit the idea of “popular constitutionalism”32 through the lens of 
Lochnerland. Those who embrace popular constitutionalism might be taken to suggest 
that constitutional meaning requires judgments of basic principle and to believe those 
judgments are more reliably made by the public than by the judiciary.33 A plea for 
attention to the risk of backlash, and for judicial deference to backlash when it occurs. 
seems natural in light of the more general view. And in this light, we can see the close 
links among popular constitutionalism, judicial responses to backlash, and Thomas 
                                                 
31 See Cass R. Sunstein, One Case At A Time (1999). 
32 See Larry Kramer, The People Themselves (2005). 
33 In my view, this is part of the account in id. 
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Jefferson’s plea for frequent constitutional amendment by an engaged citizenry.34 If 
constitutional meaning turns on judgments of morality and fact, and if those judgments 
change over time, a “living constitution” might turn out to have a powerful Jeffersonian 
element—at least if the public, and not the judges, breathes life into the document.  
More ambitiously, we can even see a kind of Jefferson’s Revenge in American 
processes of constitutional change, to the extent that the relevant changes are produced 
through processes of interpretation that are highly sensitive to popular judgments over 
time.35 It is certainly plausible to think that alterations in constitutional meaning have 
stemmed not from constitutional amendments, and not from freestanding judicial 
elaboration of principles, but from social practices and constitutional doctrine that show a 
degree of attentiveness to changing public perceptions and commitments.36 Jefferson’s 
Revenge, if it has occurred, can be found in new understandings of the document that, in 
the end, are a product of the beliefs and values of successive generations. 
In Lochnerland, the argument for judicial attention to popular judgments in 
general and to backlash in particular might be fortified by reference to the Condorcet Jury 
Theorem (CJT).37 The CJT says that if members of a group are more than 50 percent 
likely to be right, the likelihood that a majority of the group expands to 100 percent as the 
size of the group increases. We can easily imagine a situation in Lochnerland in which (a) 
large populations have a constitutionally relevant judgment and (b) most individuals are 
more than 50 percent likely to be right. If so, the majority is overwhelmingly likely to be 
right. If the population assents to a proposition that is constitutionally relevant, judges 
would do well to pay attention to them, perhaps especially if their convictions are firm. 
These claims raise many questions and serious doubts, not least from the 
Olympian point of view.38 The simplest point is that in Lochnerland, the argument for 
                                                 
34 See Sanford Levinson, Our Undemocratic Constitution (2006). 
35 See Reva Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case 
of the de facto ERA, 94 Cal L Rev (2006). 
36 Cf. Edward Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning 3-8 (1949) (emphasizing that with analogical 
reasoning, changing judicial judgments occur in a way that is attuned to social commitments). 
37 See Cass R. Sunstein, Infotopia (2006). 
38 See Sunstein, If the Public Would Be, supra note. An obvious problem is that if most people suffer from 
a systematic bias, and hence are more likely to be wrong than right, the likelihood that the majority will be 
wrong approaches 100% as the size of the group expands! Judges in Lochnerland are not likely to be 
impressed with the wisdom of crowds; believing that people are probably wrong, they might well enlist the 
Condorcet Jury Theorem to suggest that the view of the  crowd is entitled to no weight. See id.  
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attention to popular backlash is very strong. When judges make constitutional judgments 
on their own, there is a serious risk of error. Anticipation of backlash, and humility in its 
face, reduce that risk. And we can identify a sharp difference, in this light, between 
Lochnerland on the one hand and Olympus and the Land of the Ancients on the other. In 
the latter jurisdictions, there is no reason to think that most members of the public are 
more likely than not to be right on a constitutionally relevant proposition. Hence judges 
lack an epistemological reason to care about what the public thinks. In Lochnerland, 
things are altogether different. 
 
IV. Athens 
 
Now suppose that there is no particular reason to believe that judges are 
especially good, or especially bad, at giving meaning to ambiguous constitutional 
phrases. Let us imagine that we are agnostic on that question, at least over long periods of 
time. We do not know whether we are in Olympus or Lochnerland. For every Brown v. 
Bd. of Educ.,39 there is a Lochner v. New York.40 For every Dred Scott v. Sanford,41 
there is a Brandenburg v. Ohio.42 No global assessment is possible. But let us suppose 
that the Supreme Court operates in an essentially well-functioning democracy, in which 
relevant judgments are made through a system that combines reflection and reason-giving 
with accountability. Let us give this imaginary democracy a familiar name: Athens. 
In Athens, the social planner might well insist that judges should pay careful 
attention to the risk or existence of backlash.43 The reason is that backlash reflects the 
public’s judgments about basic social questions—the best conception of equality and 
liberty, the proper understanding of religious freedom, the role of property rights. For 
democratic reasons, such judgments deserve respect whether or not they are likely to be 
right. A self-governing people deserve to be ruled by its own judgments, at least if they 
cannot be shown to be wrong. 
                                                 
39 347 US 483 (1954). 
40 198 US 45 (1905). 
41 60 US 393 (1857). 
42 395 US 444 (1969). 
43 Compare the illuminating treatment in Post and Siegel, supra, emphasizing the relationship between 
legitimacy and heeding backlash. 
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It is here, in fact, that we might find another reason for Thayerianism—a reason 
founded not on the risk of judicial error, but on the commitment to democratic self-
government. A serious flaw in the use of this commitment, to justify Thayerianism, is 
that it defends on a contentious view of what self-government requires.44 Perhaps self-
government requires insistence on its preconditions, including freedom of speech and the 
right to vote; perhaps judicial review, indifferent to public commitments, can do well in 
ensuring those preconditions.45 Perhaps self-government, properly understood, requires 
respect for a wide range of individual rights.46 Perhaps judicial protection of those rights 
is indispensable.  
These are powerful responses to Thayerianism in any form. But if judges do not 
have the capacity to make superior judgments on the relevant points, Thayerianism looks 
much more appealing. At the very least, we might be able to say that on democratic 
grounds, the Supreme Court should, in Athens, be reluctant to rule in a way that produces 
significant backlash—and it should attend closely to the existence of backlash when it 
does occur.  
It should be clear that popular constitutionalism is alive and well in Athens. The 
commitment to popular constitutionalism is not founded on the view that the underlying 
questions are likely to be resolved correctly by the public and erroneously by courts. 
Instead the commitment rests on a judgment in favor of (one account of) self-government 
as such. 
 
V. Our World and Welcome to It 
 
We have now seen how backlash might be analyzed as it travels through a set of 
imaginable worlds. For us, however, no simple conclusion has emerged. It is both 
tempting and far too simple to contend that judges should simply ignore the risk of 
backlash and refuse to attend to it when it occurs. This was essentially Gunther’s view, 
and it depends on the controversial assumption that we live in Olympus (or perhaps the 
Land of the Ancients). Undoubtedly Gunther was influenced by the context in which he 
wrote, involving judicial efforts to vindicate palpably sound principles of racial justice in 
                                                 
44 See Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (2006). 
45 See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1981). 
46 See Dworkin, supra note; James Fleming, Securing the Constitution (2006). 
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the face of indefensible public opposition. But it should be unnecessary to say that that 
context is hardly the inevitable one in American political life. We should also be able to 
see that Bickel neglected the risk of judicial error in the announcement and elaboration of 
moral principle, and hence assumed, wrongly, that the only reason for “prudence” was to 
maintain a Lincolnian tension. The assumption was wrong because judges might stay 
their hand not only for the sake of expediency, but also out of an awareness of their own 
limitations and their capacity for error.  
Which world is our own? That question cannot be answered without making 
contestable normative and empirical judgments. One person’s Olympus will be another’s 
Lochnerland, and vice-versa. In any case our world does not fit any of the ideal types, 
and for that reason it is not possible to reach any clear conclusion about the relevance of 
backlash.47 But one point is simple, and it involves the importance of distinguishing 
between validations and invalidations. Much of public backlash operates against 
validations of statutory enactments. By 1953, Plessy v. Ferguson48 was widely viewed as 
outrageous; the same is true of Bowers v. Hardwick49 in 2002. The most visible public 
backlash in recent years operated against the Kelo decision,50 in which the Court offered 
a broad reading to the “public use” requirements of the takings clause. Even if our world 
is close to Lochnerland, in the sense that the Court will uphold practices that it should 
strike down, there is an evident remedy: The democratic process can usually eliminate the 
practice against which backlash has occurred.  
The point is hardly speculative. In the aftermath of Bowers v. Hardwick, a 
number of states took steps to decriminalize sodomy, whether homosexual and 
heterosexual. In the aftermath of Kelo,51 many steps were proposed, and some taken, to 
give greater protection to property rights. Perhaps most notably, President Bush signed an 
executive order that would disallow national “takings” under circumstances permitted by 
                                                 
47 Sunstein, If the Public Would Be, explores this issue in some detail. 
48 163 US 537 (1896). 
49 478 US 186 (1986). 
50 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). . For a valuable treatment of the controversy, see 
Janice Nadler et al., Government Takings of Private Property: Kelo and the Perfect Storm (Northwestern 
Public Law Research Paper No. 07-05, 2007), available at  
http://ssrn.com.ezp1.harvard.edu/abstract=962170. 
51 Id. 
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the Supreme Court.52 To be sure, any particular democratic corrective may be inadequate. 
Perhaps the relevant practice is accepted in one state but rejected in the rest; if so, the 
practice of the particular state might be intractable. Perhaps interest-group power operates 
to entrench practices that the public largely rejects. Nonetheless, it remains true that 
unjustified validations do far less damage than they might seem to do, simply because a 
mobilized public is usually in a good position to respond.  
Invalidations are of course quite different. If the Court wrongly strikes down a 
practice, and if the invalidation produces bad consequences, it is difficult for the public to 
supply a corrective. Perhaps new appointments will eventually change the situation. 
Perhaps the Court can be persuaded of the error of its ways.53 Perhaps a constitutional 
amendment will be enacted. But to the extent that Olympus does not describe social 
reality, and to the extent that ours is not the Land of the Ancients, the Court may well 
have an epistemic ground for taking account of the risk of backlash, at least in the most 
extreme cases.  
Assuming that the Supreme Court might err, we can now identify some of the 
relevant questions. If judges anticipate backlash, and tailor their rulings accordingly, what 
would be the consequences? Would anticipation of backlash produce undue timidity, in 
the form of hesitation in vindicating constitutional requirements? Or would anticipation 
of backlash produce a salutary political check on misdirected judgments on the part of the 
judiciary? Do judges have the capacity to predict public outrage and its effects, or are 
they more or less at sea? Are the public’s judgments, on morally charged questions, more 
likely to be right or wrong? 
My goal here has not, however, been to reach a final judgment on the normative 
question.54 It has been to suggest the kinds of assumptions on which any such judgment 
must be based. 
 
 
                                                 
52 The order says that the federal government must use eminent domain "...for the purpose of benefiting the 
general public and not merely for the purpose of advancing the economic interest of private parties to be 
given ownership or use of the property taken." See  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/06/20060623-10.html 
53 See, e.g., West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 US 379 (1937). 
54 See Cass R. Sunstein, If the Public Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?, Stanford 
L. Review (forthcoming). 
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